In global mobility networks, anonymous user authentication is an essential task for enabling roaming service. In a recent paper, Jiang et al. proposed a smart card based anonymous user authentication scheme for roaming service in global mobility networks. This scheme can protect user privacy and is believed to have many abilities to resist a range of network attacks, even if the secret information stored in the smart card is compromised. In this paper, we analyze the security of Jiang et al.'s scheme, and show that the scheme is in fact insecure against the stolen-verifier attack and replay attack. Then, we also propose a new smart card based anonymous user authentication scheme for roaming service. Compared with the existing schemes, our protocol uses a different user authentication mechanism, which does not require the home agent to share a static secret key with the foreign agent, and hence, it is more practical and realistic. We show that our proposed scheme can provide stronger security than previous protocols. Abstract In global mobility networks, anonymous user authentication is an essential task for enabling roaming service. In a recent paper, Jiang et al. proposed a smart card based anonymous user authentication scheme for roaming service in global mobility networks. This scheme can protect user privacy and is believed to have many abilities to resist a range of network attacks, even if the secret information stored in the smart card is compromised. In this paper, we analyze the security of Jiang et al.'s scheme, and show that the scheme is in fact insecure against the stolen-verifier attack and replay attack. Then, we also propose a new smart card based anonymous user authentication scheme for roaming service. Compared with the existing schemes, our protocol uses a different user authentication mechanism, which does not require the home agent to share a static secret key with the foreign agent, and hence, it is more practical and realistic. We show that our proposed scheme can provide stronger security than previous protocols.
Introduction
Nowadays, with the fast development of mobile technologies, Global Mobility Networks (GLOMONETs) have become widely available and interconnected. To provide global roaming service for a mobile user, remote authentication is an essential requirement. A typical remote authentication scenario involves three parties, namely a Mobile User (MU), a Foreign Agent(FA) and a Home Agent(HA). When a mobile user MU roams into a foreign network, the foreign agent FA authenticates the roaming user with the help of the user's home agent HA [1, 10, 11] .
During the roaming process in GLOMONET, the mobile user MU is very much concerned about its privacy protection. The user's identity should be protected and his/her location and activities should be kept unlinkable. It is desirable to keep mobile users' identities anonymous in the remote user authentication process. In recent years, many anonymous authentication scheme (e.g. [22, 12, 21, 2, 13, 6, 14, 19, 7, 8] ) have been proposed for roaming services in GLOMONET. However, most of the existing protocols were broken shortly after they were proposed.
Mutual Authentication is a very important security feature. It requires that the client and server prove their respective identities to each other before performing any application functions. Recently, many research work(e.g. [22, 4, 8, 23, 24, 20] ) have been done in the design and analysis of mutual authentication protocols. However, some of them have been proved to be insecure against known attacks.
In 2012, Jiang et al. [9] pointed out the security flaws in some previous smart card based anonymous user authentication protocols. In order to remedy those weaknesses, Jiang et al. proposed an authentication scheme based on quadratic residue assumption, which is very efficient. Hence, Jiang et al.'s scheme seems to be a very good candidate authentication protocol for adoption in practice. Therefore, it is very interesting to analyze this scheme in detail to ensure that the security claims that are provided by the authors hold. It is unfortunate that we found some serious flaws in their scheme. In particular, the scheme is insecure due to two important issues namely the stolen-verifier attack [17] and it cannot resist against replay attacks.
Our Contributions. The contributions of this paper are twofold. First, we show there exist several serious security flaws in Jiang et al.'s anonymous user authentication scheme, which are described as follows: 1) It is vulnerable to stolen-verifier attack. An attacker who has stolen the verifier table can obtain the session key SK and can impersonate the FA to fool the MU. 2) It also cannot resist replay attacks. Although the attacker cannot get the MU's session key shared with the FA, he/she can impersonate the MU to login the FA.
3) It is vulnerable to denial of service attack.
Second, we propose a new smart card based anonymous user authentication protocol for roaming service in global mobility networks. Our protocol makes use of a user authentication mechanism which is different from the previous approaches and can successfully prevent different kinds of network attacks.
Organization of the Paper. The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we provide some mathematical preliminaries, which will be used throughout the paper. In Section 3, we briefly review Jiang et al.'s scheme. Subsequently, we show its weaknesses in Section 4. Then, we proceed with proposing our scheme in Section 5, together with analyzing its security in Section 6. In Section 7, we compare the performance of our new protocol with the previous schemes. Section 8 concludes the paper.
Mathematical Preliminaries
In this section, we discuss three computational problem: Quadratic residue problem, discrete logarithm problem and computational Diffie-Hellman problem, which will be used throughout the paper.
Quadratic Residue Problem
Assume that n = pq, where p and q are two large primes. If y = x 2 mod n has a solution, i.e., there exists a square root for y, then y is called a quadratic residue mod n. The set of all quadratic residue numbers in [1, n − 1] is denoted by QR n . Then the quadratic residue problem states that, for y ∈ QR n , it is hard to find x without the knowledge of p and q due to the difficulty of factoring n [16] .
Discrete Logarithm Problem
Let G be a finite group, g ∈ G with order n, y ∈ G g . The problem is to find the smallest integer x ∈ {1, ..., n − 1} such that g x = y (mod n). It is easy to compute the discrete exponentiation y = g x (mod n) given g, x, n, but it is computationally infeasible to determine x given y, g, n, when n is large.
Computational Diffie-Hellman Problem
Consider a cyclic group G with order q. The CDH problem states that, given g, g x , g y for a generator g and random number x, y ∈ {1, 2, ..., q − 1}, it is computationally intractable to compute the value g xy .
The notations that will be used throughout this paper are listed in Table 1 . Step 2. HA personalizes the smart card with h(·), K MU , n and sends it to MU, where n is the modulus in the Quadratic Residue Problem.
Step 3. After receiving the smart card, the MU computes K * 
Login and Authentication Phase
Step 1. MU inserts his/her smart card into the device and enters his/her identity ID MU and password P W MU . The smart card computes
Then the smart card generates a random number n MU and computes
Step 2. Upon receiving M 1 , FA generates a random number n F A and computes
Step 3. After receiving M 2 , HA checks whether ID F A is the identity of an ally. If it is true, HA compares V 2 with V * 
where SK is the session key between FA and MU. Finally, HA sends M 3 = (V 3 , V 4 ) to FA.
Step 4. After receiving the message M 3 , FA computes V *
Step 5.
and checks whether it is equal to V 5 . If it is true, then MU establishes trust with FA; otherwise, the authentication fails.
Password Change Phase
When MU wants to renew a password, MU inserts his/her smart card into the terminal and enters his/her identity ID * MU , the old password P W MU , and the new password P W * * MU . Then the smart card retrieves
Security Analysis of Jiang et al.'s Scheme

Security against Stolen-Verifier Attacks
In Jiang et al.'s scheme, it is assumed that each foreign agent shares a unique long-term key K F H with HA which should be stored in the verifier table of HA's database. In case the verifier table in the HA's database is leaked out or stolen by an attacker, the attacker can compute SK corresponding to any user MU and can also proceed to spoofing attack. This is illustrated as follows.
Computing SK
Step 1. Eavesdrops a login request message
Step 2. Computes h(K F H n F A ) using the stolen long-term key K F H and n F A .
Step 3.
It can be seen that Jiang et al.'s protocol does not achieve perfect forward secrecy if the attacker obtains the FA's long-term key K F H shared with HA.
Spoofing Attack
Step 1. Intercepts a login request message M 2 = (M 1 , ID F A , n F A , V 2 ) and chooses a random number n F A , and then computes
Step 2. The HA authenticates the MU and FA following the step 3 of Jiang et al.'s scheme and sends message M 3 = (V 3 , V 4 ) to the attacker, where
Step 3. After receiving the message M 3 = (V 3 , V 4 ), the attacker computes
Step 4. The MU computes SK
The MU believes that the attacker is the FA. Hence, it is clear that the attacker can impersonate the FA whenever he/she likes.
Security against Replay Attacks
In Jiang et al.'s scheme, during the login and authentication phase, the MU sends the login message M 1 = (V 1 , ID HA ) to FA via a public channel, where
2 mod n. Suppose an attacker intercepts this message and sends another message M 1 = M 1 in the next time to FA. Then after receiving this message during login and authentication phase, the FA generates a random number n F A and computes V 2 = h(M 1 n F A K F H ). Subsequently, FA sends the message M 2 = (M 1 , ID F A , n F A , V 2 ) to HA. After receiving M 2 , then HA also processes this message and ensures that the attacker is a legal user. Although the attacker cannot obtain the session key SK, he/she can impersonate the MU to login to the FA. As a result, Jiang et al.'s scheme fails to provide protection against a strong replay attack.
Security against Denial of Service Attack
In the password change phase, there is no verification of old password before the new password is updated. If an attacker manages to gain temporary access to MU's smart card, he/she can launch a denial of service attack as follows:
1) Inserts MU's smart card into a card reader and initiates a password change request.
2) Submits two random strings R 1 , R 2 as MU's old password and new password.
3) The smart card computes K * * (ID MU x) , and since then MU's login request will be denied by HA during the login and authentication phase.
The Proposed Scheme
In this section, we propose a new authentication scheme with privacy preservation for global mobility networks. Notably, the new scheme makes use of a counter-based authentication mechanism to resist against replay attack. In order to resist against stolen-verifier attack [17] , we replace the static long-term key K F H with a Diffie-Hellman key. The new scheme can also resist against a range of attacks such as offline password guessing attacks and denial of service attack, even if the smart card is stolen.
Before the system begins, HA generates two secret large primes p, q and computes the number n = pq. The home agent HA chooses a multiplication group G and an element g ∈ G with order q , where p and q are public large primes and p = 2q + 1 is the modulus for the group G (p , q is different from p, q). The HA selects a private key S HA = a (< q ) and computes the public key P HA = g a mod p . Similarly, the foreign agent FA selects a private key S F A = b (< q ) and computes the public key P F A = g b mod p . The new protocol has three phases: registration, login and authentication, and password change.
Registration Phase
Step 1. The MU chooses his/her own identity ID MU and password P W MU , and generates a large random number d. He/she then computes the hash value f = h(ID MU P W MU d), and sends the registration message ID MU , f to the HA via a secure channel.
Step 2. HA computes K * MU = h(ID MU x) ⊕ f using the secret random number x. HA then initiates a counter ctr MU = 0 for MU and creates a record (ID MU , ctr MU ) in its database. HA then personalizes the smart card with h(·), K * MU , ctr MU , n and sends it to MU.
Step 3. After receiving the smart card, the MU computes f 
Login and Authentication Phase
Step Step 2.
Step 3. HA → F A : M 3 . HA checks whether ID F A is the identity of an ally. If it is true, HA compares Step 
Security Analysis of The Proposed Scheme
In this section, we analyze the security of the proposed scheme and show that it can resist different types of attacks and also provides user anonymity.
User Anonymity
It is very important and necessary for a secure authentication protocol to provide user anonymity [3, 5] . From Figure 1 , we can see that the communication transcript reveals no information about the identity ID MU of the user. In fact, ID MU is concealed in V 1 , only the person who knows the value of p, q can solve the quadratic residue problem to obtain ID MU . In our scheme, the secret value p, q is stored by HA. Therefore, the attacker including the FA cannot identify the MU from the login message. [18] In our scheme, we used the counter based authentication mechanism to prevent replay attacks. If the adversary replays the previous login message, then HA will detect the attack when examining the counter ctr MU of the user MU. The concrete step is as follows: During the login and authentication phase, when the HA receives a message M 2 = (M 1 , ID F A , V 2 ), it verifies the retrieved counter ctr MU with the stored counter ctr MU corresponding to the ID MU . If the message M 2 = (M 1 , ID F A , V 2 ) is a replayed message, then the HA will find that ctr MU ≥ ctr MU . The HA will simply reject this message. Hence, our scheme prevents the replay attacks through the use of counter.
Security against Replay Attacks
6.3 Security against Impersonation Attacks [15] We consider three types of impersonation attacks, namely MU impersonation attack, FA impersonation attack, and HA impersonation attack.
MUImpersonation. In order to impersonate the MU, the adversary must obtain the value of ID MU , K MU . We then consider two situations: (1) the adversary compromises the user identity and password but the smart card is secure; and (2) the adversary compromises the smart card but the user identity and password are secure.
In the first case, it is obvious that adversary is unable to obtain the value of K MU since the smart card is secure. Notice that K MU is concealed in F A/HA Impersonation. Since FA and HA use Diffie-Hellman keys to authenticate each other, the adversary is unable to impersonate either of them due to the intractability of the Diffie-Hellman problem. Also, the attacker cannot impersonates FA to fool MU. Since he/she does not posses the secret x and ID MU , n MU , the attacker cannot compute
On the other hand, it is impossible for him/her to obtain the session key SK by computing SK = V 3 ⊕ h(K) due to the difficulty of solving Diffie-Hellman problem.
6.4 Secure Key Establishment [15] At the end of the protocol, the MU, FA and HA will establish a common session key SK = h(h(ID MU x) ID F A n MU ctr MU ). Since the attacker does not know the value of x, he/she cannot compute the SK directly. Even if the previous session keys are disclosed, the attacker cannot obtain any future session key due to the security of one-way hash function.
Protection against Attacks in Section 4
In this section, we show how our new scheme overcomes the security weaknesses presented in Section 4. 1) In our proposed scheme, there is no verifier table in HA's database to store the secret information of MU or FA. Thus, the attacker cannot launch stolen-verifier attack [17] .
2) In order to prevent replay attack [18] , we used the counter based authentication mechanism. HA can detect the attack by examining the counter ctr MU of the user MU.
3) In order to prevent denial of service attack [25] , the smart card will verify whether the P W MU entered by MU is correct or not in the login phase and password update phase.
Performance Comparison
We compare our new scheme with two recently proposed smart card based anonymous user authentication schemes due to He et al. [8] and Jiang et al. [9] . In Table 2 , we provide the comparison based on the key security of these schemes, while we compare their efficiency in terms of computation and communication cost in Table 3 . The following notation are used in Table 3 . t h : The time complexity of the hash computation; t m : The time complexity of the modular squaring computation; t qr : The time complexity of computing a square root modulo n; t me : The time complexity of computing modular exponentiation; t sym : The time complexity of symmetric encryption/decryption; t asym : The time complexity of encryption/decryption or signature using asymmetric cryptosystem.
From Table 2 , we can conclude that our proposed scheme provides better security and usability than the other two schemes. He et al.'s scheme [8] does not satisfy any of the criteria listed in table 2. Jiang et.al.'s scheme [9] does not satisfy four of the nine criteria. Our scheme can achieve all the criteria listed in table 2. In particular, one special feature of our scheme is that we do not require the HA to store some secret information that is shared with FA in his/her database, which enhances our scheme's security strength to resist against different attacks.
In Table 3 , we summarize the efficiency comparison between our scheme and other schemes in [9, 8] . From the table 3, it is easy to see that our scheme is more efficient than He et al.'s scheme [8] . Our scheme requires two extra Modular Exponentiation for FA and HA as compared with Jiang et al.'s scheme. It is not a problem because the FA and the HA are powerful servers. On the other hand, our scheme achieves stronger security than the previous solutions, as is shown in Table 2 .
Conclusion
In this paper, we discussed several security weaknesses in a recently proposed smart card based privacy preservation user authentication scheme by Jiang et al. We showed that this scheme is vulnerable to stolen-verifier attacks, replay attacks, and denial of service attack. In order to withstand its security flaws, subsequntly we proposed a new smart card based user authentication scheme with user's anonymity for roaming service which can achieve stronger security. Our scheme does not require HA to store a verifier-table in its database and uses counter based authentication mechanism to prevent replay attacks.
